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Pornographies*
LESLIE GREEN
Law and Philosophy, York University, Toronto

I. PARADIGMS OF PORNOGRAPHY

T

O be radical about pornography used to mean that one favored less

censorship; now it often means that one favors more. That political change
reflects a shift in the dominant paradigm of pornography and its putative evils.
Until quite recently, most people who believed pornography wrong thought that
it offended against decency and propriety and was therefore obscene. That was
certainly the view of the law. English judges first created the crime of obscene
libel in 1727 on the basis that such expression tended to corrupt the morals of the
King's subjects,1 a thought that inspired most subsequent legislation in the
common-law world. Sometimes the underlying concern really was paternalistic:
pornography degrades and corrupts its producers and consumers; the law forces
them to become better people. More often, however, it was just moralism of the
familiar sorts: the view that a majority of a community is entitled to enforce its
moral views on the rest, either because that is democratic or because that is just
what it means to be a community. The obscenity paradigm thus had two features.
First, it was illiberal: it ranked personal autonomy below realizing the good,

enforcing the majority will, or embodying communitarian values. Second, it
was gender neutral: to understand the nature of pornography did not require
theorizing r elations b e tw e e n m e n a n d wom e n .

On t h e obs cenit y

par adi gm , pornography was a matter of virtue versus vice, majorities versus
minorities.
The new paradigm is importantly different, for now the antagonists are
understood to be men versus women. First, the kind of moral concern
pornography raises is no longer thought to be a matter of decency or
propriety, and the injury it does is neither personal nor social corruption.
Pornography, as the subtitle of Andrea Dworkin's book puts it, is about men
possessing women.''2 In the words of Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin's model legislation, it is

the graphic sexually explicit subordination

ofwomen in pictures and/or words.''3 Thus, pornography is understood to be

harmful to women, and public policy in this area is a special case of fulfilling the
duty to prevent harm. How is pornography harmful? First, it desensitizes men
and incites them to rape, abuse and discriminate against women. It may also
encourage some women to internalize men's view of them as sexual objects
open to such abuse. Those are its contingent causal effects. But it also harms in a
second way, by legitimating and even constituting certain practices of sex
discrimination: on this view, pornography simply is the subordination and
silencing of women.4
The new paradigm consorts easily with liberal values, and one should not be
misled by the fact that its most articulate defenders are feminists who say

they reject liberalism, nor by the fact that many self-styled liberals reject the
restrictions on freedom of expression that these feminists endorse. Its liberal
credentials are signaled not merely by the fact that it endorses personal
autonomy, but by its settled preference for autonomy over decency, democracy
or community. It does, however, insist that autonomy must be made real and that
it must be for all. The free speech of men silences the free speech of women,''
says MacKinnon, It is the same social goal, just other people.''5 That the liberty
of some may be restricted to promote a greater liberty of all is not in itself a
radical thought. What is new and challenging is rather the claim that that is what
censorship actually does.
Not only does the new paradigm offer a recognizably liberal argument, it also
offers a moral argument about pornography, for it endorses (or is at least
consistent with) the familiar harm principle. Indeed, since J.S. Mill claimed that
the sole valid reason for exercising coercive power over rational adults is to
prevent harm to others, this has been a centerpiece of liberal political morality.6
So one should not be misled by the fact that many feminists would also say,
with MacKinnon, that pornography is not a moral issue.''7 They only mean
that we should not restrict pornography in order to

enforce conventional

morality, while conceding that if that were the aim, then we should favor
freedom of expression instead. They also believe, however, that conceptual
and empirical considerations show that pornography is extremely harmful, at
least to women, and thus belongs with other categories of expression that
areproperly subject to restriction. That explains why, as I said at the outset,

the old radicalism of opposing censorship has been replaced by a new
radicalism favoring it.
The paradigm shift has not, of course, been complete in either theory or
practice. Among philosophers, there is still considerable debate about how best
to understand the concept of harm'' for these purposes. There is no argument
about things like being raped, beaten, enslaved or discriminated against. The
worries surround the ideas of being subordinated'' or silenced,'' notions which
can slide into feeling subordinated or feeling silenced, which are in turn
inextricably bound up with feeling put upon, outraged or offended, at which
point we may approach moralism of the old sort. So there is a theoretical dispute
about exactly how the old and new paradigms are to be distinguished, and a good
deal of polemic on the part of anti-censorship writers trying to push procensorship writers back into the obscenity model together, it must be said, with a
certain amount of unprovoked backsliding on the part of

the

pro-censorship

forces themselves.
At the level of practice things are even more ambiguous. We can develop our
theories afresh but we must often reform our institutions piecemeal, especially
when that reform is undertaken by judges. For example, the Supreme Court of
Canada, in a judgment much admired by supporters of the new paradigm, tried
to fashion the silk purse of harm-prevention out of the sow's ear of moralism. In

R. v. Butler, the Court recycled the obscenity prohibitions of the Criminal Code,
holding that material is obscene not because it offends against morals, but
because it is perceived by public opinion to be harmful to society, particularly to

women.''8 On that basis it upheld criminal obscenity laws against a challenge
based on freedom of expression. However, it seems that the Court did not fully
understand the distinction it adopted. For the new paradigm prohibits things that
are in fact harmful, not things that are perceived by public opinion'' to be
harmful. Unwilling, or perhaps unable,9 to let go fully of moralism, the Court
found the things perceived harmful to be those very things held repugnant by
present conventional morality; it said that pornography is second-class
expression because It appeals only to the most base aspect of individual
fulfillment'';10 and it announced that the notions of moral corruption and harm
to society are not distinct . . . but are inextricably linked. It is moral corruption
ofa certain kind which leads to the detrimental effect on society.''11 I am sure
that Canadians have only begun to reap the fruits of this confusion.
In such tentative and disordered ways the new paradigm displaces the old; but
displace it it does. It is not that we are now agreed about what to do: we disagree
strenuously about the significance of pornography, about what harm it causes,
about the risks of limiting free expression, and about matters of institutional
design. The point is rather that these disagreements are increasingly framed by
the assumptions that freedom of expression must not be limited unless harm can
be shown, and that no such analysis can ignore the context of gender relations.
II. GAY PORNOGRAPHY AND THE NEW PARADIGM
As new paradigms do, however, this one gives rise to new controversies, one of
the most interesting of which involves sexual orientation. If pornography is about
men harming women, how should we understand gay male pornography? It

poses no special problem for the old paradigm: gay pornography is as obscene as
straight pornography, maybe more obscene. (It certainly attracted more than its
proportionate share of prosecutions.) But how are we to bring it within the new
paradigm?
Most feminist discussions proceed on the basis that pornography is
heterosexual in its nature and audience. Is this innocuous? One cannot write
about everything and maybe it is just as well if philosophers avoid subjects where
their factual knowledge is modest or their empathy slight. Nevertheless, there
may be risks here. I must content myself with one example. In a helpful and lucid
paper, Rae Langton defends the new paradigm by explaining how pornography
may literally subordinate or silence women. Her main idea is that pornographic
utterances have something in common with the performatives'' of speech-act
theory: they may authoritatively establish which moves in the sexual game are
legitimate.''12 Pornography is thus like a biased umpire in a game among players
of vastly unequal power. She thinks that liberal debate'' operates on the frail
assumption that pornographic utterances are made by a powerless minority, a
fringe group especially vulnerable to moralistic persecution,'' whereas in reality
pornography's voice is the voice of the ruling power.''13
Langton's heterosexual presumption is fundamental to her polemical project: she
is trying to make analytical sense out of, and answer criticism of, some central
texts of radical feminism, a theory whose center of gravity is the critique of

sexism and whose attitude towards the critique of heterosexism is often coyand
sometimes hostile.14 But what happens if we release our thinking from that

harness? Will it then remain plausible to speak of the language game of sex''?
What answer will we give to the question of whether pornography is the voice
of the ruling power''? Will it still seem foolish to think that pornography is
produced by fringe group[s] especially liable to moralistic persecution''?
Without the heterosexual presumption, these questions may all take new
answers. Perhaps, then, silence about sexual orientation is not so benign after all.
Perhaps if we theorize about pornography as if its heterosexual variant were the
only case, the paradigm case, or even just the most interesting case, we will miss
things that are important for both theory and practice.
So the first problem is one of scope: the new paradigm may only apply to some
pornography. This leads to a second problem. When the new paradigm is used to
recommend censorship, it is on the basis that this will promote the autonomy and
equal citizenship of women. However, generic restrictions on pornography,
applied without regard to sexual orientation, may offend the underlying ideals.
Representations of minority sexualities are not a staple of public discourse,
advertising campaigns, schoolbooks, television, etc. As Eve Sedgwick remarks,
advice on how to help your kids turn out gay, not to mention your students,
your parishioners, your therapy clients, or your military subordinates, is less
ubiquitous than you might think.''15 Our public culture in fact presents a
heterosexual uniformity that is quite astonishing when compared with the diverse
realities of our lives. So gay people largely make their own way, their existence
and needs acknowledged only in the margins of popular and high culture. This
has a consequence: if there are significant differences among different

sexualities-different social meanings, different structures of power, different
possibilities for change-then uniform regulations governing something called
pornography'' are liable to have different effects on different groups. When
books, magazines, art, theatre, films and videos fall under the ban of the censor
or the chill of lawsuits, it is almost certain that the burden will fall more heavily
on sexual minorities than on the majority. Heterosexuality does not become
invisible when the censor cuts. Thus, before we help ourselves to attitudes
towards, and then prescriptions regarding, pornography'' we had better
consider whether these differences are indeed significant.
Here, I offer some reasons for thinking that the differences are real and crucial. I
defend three claims. First, the meanings of gay pornography cannot be reduced
to the heterosexual variant, so the new paradigm has no direct application here.
Second, there is no evidence that gay pornography harms men in the way that
heterosexual pornography is alleged to harm women, and some reason to
suspectthat it does not do so. Finally, and more speculatively, I suggest
that some features of gay male pornography, in particular its capacity to
objectify people, are not necessarily harmful and may even be beneficial in the
gay male context. I conclude with some suggestions about what all this
might mean for our understanding of pornography in general, and for the
sorts of policies we ought to endorse.
Occasionally, proponents of the new paradigm do discuss gay male pornography, in
an attempt to assimilate it to their model. Most philosophically interesting is the
claim that gay pornography does in fact harm women and is therefore not

fundamentally different from heterosexual pornography. This conclusion is
reached, not by positing an unusual causal path from the effects of pornography
on its gay consumers to its results for women, but rather by offering a particular
view of what it is to count as a woman.'' To be sure, other claims and attitudes
also seem to play a role in the theory. Let us here notice but set aside the panicky
homophobia to which even radical feminists may fall prey. Andrea Dworkin for
instance says that: Male homosexuals, especially in the arts and in fashion,
conspire with male heterosexuals to enforce the male-supremacist rule that the
female must be that made thing against which the male acts to experience himself as
male.''16 Thus we have a world homosexual conspiracy allied with the
heterosexuals-Tchaikovsky with Wagner, Michelangelo with Rubens, Proust
with Lawrence, Isaac Mizrachi with Ralph Lauren-all shoulder to shoulder, or
penis to penis, in league against women. Traditionally the last to be chosen for
every team, gay men are now promoted to first string without any try-outs. But
the stereotyped association of male homosexuals'' and arts and fashion'' and the
suspicions of conspiracy are not secure foundations for a serious social
theory. That gay men are men, that they can be misogynists and that they enjoy
some of the benefits of male privilege are all both true and significant. But those
facts are as true of gay truck-drivers, lawyers, baseball players and university
professors as they are of film makers, fashion designers and interior decorators.
And what we need to show here is that gay male pornography causes or contributes to the
vices that gay men can share with other men. Overt hostility to those in
stereotypically gay professions does not, as far as I can see, advance this case.

III. REDUCTIVISM
A. THE HONORARY WOMEN THESIS
Here is a better start. Dworkin also says, The feminine or reference to women in
male homosexual pornography clarify for the male that the significance of the
penis cannot be compromised . . . In pornography, the homosexual male, like
theheterosexual male, is encouraged to experience and enjoy his sexual
superiority over women.''17 This might strike the casual reader as a misprint,
or as post- modernism avant la lettre-there generally are no women in
gay male pornography, for the unprofound reason that gay men rarely
find women sexually arousing. How then are we to make sense of the
claim that such pornography nonetheless contains the feminine'' or makes
reference'' to women thereby clarifying''-in case there were any doubt-the
significance of the penis in gay male sexuality?
Perhaps the argument might be completed this way.18 Even if there are no females
in the text or images, there is always someone who plays the role that patriarchal
sexuality assigns to women, the role of receptivity, passivity, subordination, etc.
If one thought that in most homosexual acts one partner is
being the man'' and that another is being the woman,'' then we could have
representations that, in a sense, make reference to women. And since the general
dominance-based account of pornography already has a story (indeed, a number
of stories) about how women in pornography are dominated in pornography,
and about how women's domination in pornography causes and constitutes
women's domination in the world, we have most of what we need for an account

of how a female-less pornography nonetheless literally harms women. We can
have women without having any females. Thus, we reduce what initially seems
like an exceptional case to the standard case. In MacKinnon and Dworkin's
model anti-pornography ordinance we find this definition, Pornography shall
mean the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women . . . The use of
men, children or transsexuals in the place of women . . . shall also constitute
pornography under this section.''19 Now, this is a piece of proposed legislation,
not political theory; but we can see how it might draw inspiration from, and in
any case promote, the theory just sketched. The thought that men may, in a
certain way, take the place of women'' in pornography I shall call the Honorary
Women Thesis.
As reconstructed, however, the Honorary Women Thesis is open to objection.
For the thesis reduces homosexual acts to ersatz heterosexual acts by projecting
onto those acts meanings, conventions and distinctions that are indeterminate,
unstable, and parochial. Consider, for instance, the distinction between

active''

and passive'' often used to distinguish masculine and feminine roles in sex. That
this distinction is often indeterminate is evident if we consider, say, an image of
two people kissing or engaging in mutual masturbation. Is there a plausible way
to classify one of them as active and the other passive? Is there in fellatio? It is
only

when

we

can

map

the

distinction

onto

some

conventional

view

aboutappropriate gender roles that we say which is which. But in many cases we
simply cannot.20 The distinction is also unstable. There is often no guarantee as
to who will end up doing what to whom: a penetrator in one scene may end

up being penetrated in another. This is not to deny that some gay men, including
some gay male pornography stars, experience role stability in some of their
sexual interests. The point is that this is not, over the entire repertoire of
familiar

sexual

acts,

sufficiently

common

to

support

a

reductivist

interpretation about the categories into which the persons fall.
Finally, and most important, the distinction is parochial. The meanings that
heterosexual cultures assign to particular gay male sex acts may not be the
meanings that gay subcultures assign to them. For a pornographic text or image to
bear the meaning, for example, Women may be subordinated,'' in a way that
causes harm, the audience must take it to mean that. It is through attitudinal change
in its consumers that pornography is said to do its harm. Thus, we need to show,
not merely that there is a possible gendered reading of the pornographic text or
image, but that that is the normally recognized conventional reading among its
audience. Straight men, it is true, sometimes imagine that it is less gay'' to be
fellated than to perform fellatio, and that tells us something important about the
meanings that they assign to sex acts. But straight men are not the standard
audience for gay pornography. Consumers of gay pornography normally do not
and certainly need not interpret their own sexuality through that lens. The
parochialism of these distinctions needs to be understood in light of audience
segregation. Gay consumers of pornography normally consume gay male
pornography when it is available, and heterosexual men appear not to have any
significant erotic interest in gay male pornography.21 So even if some people would
be inclined to construe some men performing some acts as taking the place of

women,'' they are likely to be a minority of the audience for gay male pornography,
and their tastes and interests are unlikely to be catered to by its producers.
Perhaps some of these objections can be met if we construe the thesis more
abstractly. One might say that it is not the projection of gendered meanings onto
body parts, acts, etc. that recapitulates the dominance of men over women, but
rather the objectifying sexual attention itself. It may not matter that gay men do
not see other gay men playing the woman'' or that they shift in and out of
gendered sexual roles. It may be enough that gay male pornography, like other
pornographies, makes images of bodies available to the gaze for sexualized
consumption, and that to be the object to another's subject is in itself to be
feminized. Thus, not merely passive or receptive males, but anyone in
theobjectified mode, even the so-called active'' partner, is in that way an
honorary woman, for he functions in the system of sexualized power in just
the way that women function, and thus pornography remains the graphic
sexually explicit subordination of women.
I reserve for Section 5 below discussion of objectification'' in its own right.
Here I wish to focus only on the link between objectification and feminization,
the idea that the objectified are somehow turned into women. The argument
begins on the solid footing that gender is a social construction. As de Beauvoir
rightly said, one is not born a woman. Rather, this is an identity constituted by a
variable set of roles, meanings and expectations that are matters of human
thought and practice. The most challenging varieties of contemporary feminism
add another feature. A gendered position is not just a matter of social differences

projected onto anatomical differences, but it is also a matter of social
domination, of the unjust disadvantage that those with female bodies
experience as a result of the gender system. Let us assume that to be right.
Does it follow, then, that anyone who is dominated in or through sex takes the
place of a woman? It does not. For gender is not the only asymmetrically
constructed social difference; the same is true of race and class and, in some
societies, sexual orientation. To establish that convention or practice constructs
an asymmetrical ranking of social positions, for instance objectifier and
objectified, is not sufficient to show that the positions thus constructed are
gendered ones. Being in a position of dominance is at best one necessary feature
of the social construction man.'' To count as a man one must not only have this
(and other) social features, one must also have, pretend to have, or be taken to
have certain biological features. In particular, one must have (or pretend etc. to
have) enough of the anatomical features of the male sex.22 The gender distinction
is, among other things, a set of dominance relations projected onto (presumed)
anatomical differences. Without the latter we may still have some sort of classordered relations, but we do not have gender. For that reason, the objectifying
gaze in gay male pornography does not suffice to produce social women. To turn
men into women the gaze would need to be a good deal more powerful than it in
fact is.
B. THE AFFIRMING EXCEPTION THESIS
The Honorary Women Thesis rests, then, on an over-simple view about the social
construction of gender, and it fails to notice the importance of audience

segregation in pornography. But there may be forms of reductivism that do not
fall into either trap. Consider what I shall call the Affirming Exception
Thesis.This acknowledges that gay men are not in any relevant sense
women, but maintains

that

the

character

of

the

sex

acts

depicted

nonetheless supports heterosexual norms and in that way leads to harm to
actual women. Here is MacKinnon's version:
The capacity of gender reversals (dominatrix) and inversions (homosexuality) to
stimulate sexual excitement is derived precisely from their mimicry or parody or
negation or reversal of the standard arrangement. This affirms rather than
undermines or qualifies the standard sexual arrangement as the standard sexual
arrangement ............. 23

The idea that homosexuality is in some way a gender inversion'' is a bit quaint,
but let this pass. What I want to pursue is the independent suggestion that
mimicking, parodying, negating or reversing the standard'' arrangement
somehow affirms it.
Mimicry might be said to affirm a standard by copying it when one might have
changed it; but the failure of the Honorary Women Thesis shows that gay sex is
not normally a mimicry of straight sex. What then about parody, negation and
reversal? Surely they function not as instances of the rule, but as exceptions to it.
Does breaking a rule in some way affirm that rule? The claim that variations
from a norm ratify that norm is true only if the variations are also seen as

deviations, are criticized as such, and if the criticism is regarded as legitimate.24 In
that case, however, it is not the variations, but the critical reactions to them

that affirm the norm.
It is doubtless true that many critical reactions to gay pornography affirm
sexist and heterosexist norms. To say that these representations are unnatural,
sick, weird, disgusting, etc. is to endorse heterosexism. To say that they are
degrading because they show men allowing themselves to be treated like women
is also to affirm sexism. These repugnant, common attitudes are here irrelevant
however, for even in its rare moments of ironic detachment, gay pornography
does not stand as a critical commentary on the acts it displays and it does not
elicit these or similar critical reactions from its normal audience. To the extent
that gay pornography expresses any evaluative attitude at all towards its content,
it is surely that of tolerating or endorsing it and thus of supporting a different
norm.
If we reject those forms of reductivism, what then remains of the claim that
gay pornography actually harms women? Perhaps it ultimately rests on
the unacknowledged belief that male homosexuality itself harms women,
together with the obvious truth that gay pornography affirms homosexuality.
The thought that male homosexuality harms women is of surprisingly long
pedigree: in 1785 Jeremy Bentham took it to be one of the main arguments
he had to refute indefending gay people from persecution.25 Two centuries
later the argument persists, though in a modified form. No longer is the
worry that male homosexuality robs women of husbands and children, now
it is enough that it celebrates maleness, something not thought to promote
gender equity.26 As MacKinnon puts it, To the extent that gay men choose

men because they are men, the meaning of masculinity is affirmed as well as
undermined.''27
Let us explore this idea further, for I think that it motivates many of
the familiar feminist reductionisms. There are two difficulties with the claim
as it stands. First, gay men do not normally focus their love interests in all
men but only in other gay men, who are not in fact icons of cultural masculinity.
(Indeed, to the extent that masculinity-affirmation is done by love-interests at
all, it is less the work of gay men than of heterosexual women, who
usually fall in love with heterosexual men.) Second, it is odd to suppose
that gay male desire is masculinity-affirming just because the love-object is
male, for the object is loved by a male subject, and on conventional gender
stereotyping that taints the masculinity of both. It is true that MacKinnon's
comment allows that gay men both affirm and undermine masculinity in
choosing men. But surely if something both affirms and undermines a certain
meaning, the net effect may nonetheless be undermining if the aspects in which it
undermines are more numerous, significant or weighty than those in which it
affirms. Consider, for example, race-sensitive anti-discrimination laws. It is
possible that in just naming and referring to races such legislation affirms
what we should be concerned to deny: that racial kinds are a proper way to
classify people. One might say on that basis that anti- discrimination laws
partly serve to affirm racism. Nonetheless, such legislation simultaneously
undermines-or at any rate tries to undermine-some of the more serious social
consequences of racial classification. And if race came to have fewer

significant consequences, we might hope that racial classifications would
become less salient and, perhaps, ultimately irrelevant. At the distant,
utopian, end of this process, we might even hope for a world without a
concept of race. Why should something analogous not be true about the
current meanings of masculinity? Why must the male-centredness of gay
male sexuality be predominantly masculinity-affirming?
Perhaps

this

ignores

an

important

part

of

the

thesis,

however,

for

MacKinnon's complaint is that gay men choose men because they are men. I take
this to mean that there is something at least prima facie undesirable about
choosing men as love objects, because of certain things that any such choice must
express or celebrate. But what does it mean to choose a man

because'' he is a

man? This is certainly not an empty idea, for a man might choose male sexual
partners for other reasons: for example, because they are the only ones
available,as in boarding schools, prisons or the navy. Perhaps the thought is
this.28 On a dominance view of gender, the class of men is in majority a class
of those who oppress women. So gay men, in being attracted to members of that
class, may be

attracted to them in virtue of the oppressor-making

characteristics or correlates of that class: they may seek lovers who are
aggressive, domineering, self-centered, macho, and so forth. More generally, if
the category man'' picks out a gender that is defined partly in virtue of its
dominant social position, then it would be easy to think that if one loves men,
one must love dominators. This is an ugly thought-though there are no
doubt some gay men (and some heterosexual women) who do find these

traits attractive. But it is in any case mistaken. The context is an opaque one, so
to say that Alex loves Abe, who in fact occupies the social role man,'' does not
entail that Alex loves Abe in virtue of this one of Abe's man-making features.
He may love him in virtue of more benign man- making features, such as his
courage. Or such social attributes of conventional masculinity may be wholly
irrelevant to Alex-he may be attracted to Abe's unconventional masculinity,
or to Abe's embodied maleness, without regard to the rest of his gender traits.
Even if dominance is a necessary feature of the social position man,'' it is not
sufficient; we also need to take into account the (real, pretended or perceived)
anatomical features of the male sex. Homosexual desire, like any other, is
individuated by its object, and here we need the familiar distinction between sex
and gender. Homosexual desire in its standard forms is an attraction to people of
the same sex as oneself, that is, to those with a similar sexual embodiment.
The extent to which it is also an eroticized response to conventional masculine
(or, in the case of lesbian, feminine) cultural or psychological traits is

highly

variable. I am not denying that there may be people whose sexuality

is

oriented to the social gender of the partner rather than to his anatomical sex.
For instance, there probably are some men who are

sexually

enthusiastic

about, but broadly indifferent among, any of the following set of people:
feminine straight women, femme dykes, straight male cross-dressers, gay drag
queens, and effeminate gay men. Such men are aroused by the feminine, but
not necessarily by females. Does that make them heterosexual? For

some

reason, I find it hard to think of a man who chases cross-dressers and drag

queens as straight (unless he is very shortsighted).
Sexual orientation is in fact about sex, not gender, and to be attracted to men
because they are male is what it is for men to be homosexual. In a context where
being male is an adequate guarantee of social masculinity the two will obviously
overlap; they may even have identical extensions. In the Symposium,
Aristophanes calls homosexual boys, the most manly in

their

nature,''

because they are chips off the original all-male block.29 But in homophobic
societies gay men are unlikely to be seen as the most manly of men, and choosing
one as a lover is not in fact the most masculinity-affirming thing that a guy might
do-and Aristophanes, that notorious joker, knows it.
The reductionisms of the Honorary Women Thesis and the Affirming
Exception Thesis are made at all plausible only by indulging a familiar laxity
about the concepts of sex and gender. This may reveal a mistaken theoretical
view of the concept sex'' (that it is equivalent to our concept gender'') or it
may just be an embarrassed euphemism. It may also be symptomatic of a deepseated dislike of sexual orientations. John Stoltenberg is open about this. He
writes: To be oriented' toward a particular sex as the object of one's sexual
expressivity means, in effect, having a sexuality that is like target practicekeeping it aimed at bodies who display a particular sexual definition above all
else . . .'' which, he thinks, is just another form of sex discrimination in the service
of the status quo and thus to be resisted.30 However, for most people sexual
orientation is nothing like target practice-it requires neither skill, effort, nor
repetition. Stoltenberg is here misled by his thought that sexual orientation is a

matter of keeping aimed'' at bodies who display a particular sexual definition

above all else. This is doubly misleading. First, one does not normally need to try to
keep from drifting into an interest in sexes that are discordant with one's
orientation. It just comes naturally, so to speak. Second, even when the sex of
one's partner is a necessary condition for one's attraction and arousal, it is
normally neither a sufficient nor a uniquely necessary condition-it might not
even be among the most significant of the set of jointly necessary conditions.
While gay men are indeed sexually attracted to other males, they are not typically
attracted to all and any men. There is nothing odd about having other highly
desirable or even necessary conditions in a boyfriend, for instance that he be
intelligent, handsome, kind or honest.
Stoltenberg's wish that sexual orientation itself would go vanish so as to
promote gender equality has certain affinities with the reductivist thesis. If there
were no sexual orientations then how could gay male pornography fail to be just
plain pornography? I am uncertain whether a world beyond sexual orientation, a
world in which the sexed character of another's body would be beneath erotic
notice, would be a better or more equitable world than our own. But it would not
be our world, and possibly not even a world accessible from this one.
There is here an analogy with the old and dubious idea that androgyny might
cure sexism. Of course, universal bisexuality would not itself change anything,
since that too is a form of attraction oriented by sex, though it includes both
homosexual and heterosexual reponses. What Stoltenberg needs is a

state

of

affairs in which people have sex without regard to sex at all, in which they

eroticize only unsexed features of their partners. What would it take to
transformhuman sexuality in this way? It is unlikely, for example, that people
might fail to notice the sex of their partners. Sally Haslanger has argued that
sex and some form of gender distinctions will probably always be present in
human society, for there are things about others' bodies that we will not, and
possibly should not, fail to notice.

[T]here are reasons why sex is more socially significant than eye-color, that aren't
wholly arbitrary. I may not notice the eye-color of my sexual partner, but I'd better
notice whether we are of different sexes so that I can anticipate and be prepared for
the possibility of conception. And it is not obvious that our cultural narratives
should ignore the fact that female embodiment and male embodiment involve
different experiences .............31

None of this is to deny that sex may become extraordinarily different for any of us
from what it is now and that the hazards into which it may fall might be
eliminated. But sexual orientation itself will probably remain, and remain what it is
now: a benign human variation.
IV. ANALOGOUS HARMS
There may be other ways to defend the reductionist thesis, but let us leave it
behind. Gay pornography might fall within the new paradigm even if gay men
are in no sense women, if they occupy no similar position, and if sexual
orientation is an inevitable feature of human sexuality. For even if gay male
pornography does not harm women, it may do something relevantly similar: it
may cause some men to harm other men. It may incite them to abuse, rape or

discriminate against other men; it may subordinate and silence the victims of this
abuse; it may legitimate this whole system of oppression. This, then, is a second
sense in which men might be said to take the place of women'' in pornography. I
need to underscore that this is not what the new paradigm itself contemplatesas I said above, it is harm to women rather than harm to people in general that it
takes to be distinctive of pornographic materials. Whether pornography might
also harm men has not seemed an urgent worry.
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In both cases, however, the

moral concerns are similar. If harm to women warrants special attention, then so
surely does harm to men. But does gay male pornography harm men?
Those who are confident that there are analogous harms may motivate their
hypothesis with certain general claims about the nature of male sexual desire
andthe way it responds to pornography. Andrea Dworkin, for instance, says
that,
[M]ale sexual aggression is the unifying thematic and behavioral reality of male
sexuality; it does not distinguish homosexual men from heterosexual men''33though, she admits, an exceptional and minuscule'' minority of both gay and
straight men escape it. Normal male sexuality, on this view, is aggressive; sexual
orientation is only a matter of the preferred victim. Domination is just what all
men enact in sex; pornography incites and legitimates it. Straight men do it to
women; gay men to men.
I will not here test these undefended assertions about the essence of male
sexuality. But I do want to explore the connection between them and a
dominance-based theory of pornography. If both aggressor and victim are of the

same sex, there can be no sex-linked definition of a victim-class. And if that is so,
there can be no gay analogue of the war of men against women-gay male
sexuality would be more like the war of all against all. How then does dominance
figure in the homosexual context?
When we consider the constitutive harms of pornography, the subordination
and silence that it is said to express and the discrimination that results, we need
to keep track of who is doing what to whom. Let us look again at the way the
new paradigm analyzes the heterosexual case. It begins with the observation that
women suffer abuse and discrimination at the hands of an oppressor class of
men, it formulates general psychological and sociological hypotheses about what
causes the oppressors' attitudes, and then it suggests ways in which pornography
might contribute to attitude formation: by conditioning, legitimating, and so on.
Consider now the relevant analogy. Do gay men suffer analogous harms? Can
they be imputed to the acts or blameworthy omissions of an oppressor class? And
what is the composition and psychological make up of that class?
Allowing for difficulties in applying the notion of oppression'' to men, there is
nonetheless no serious doubt that, even in so-called liberal countries, gay men
are now often attacked, abused, subordinated, silenced and discriminated
against.34 So there is one similar set of harms. Here is another: gay boys and men
may also internalize the homophobic attitudes of their environment and in that
way come to share the oppressors' view of them. There is, therefore, at least a
prima facie similarity in the nature and significance of the disadvantages in
question. But is this causally connected with the existence or content of gay male

pornography? That is unlikely, for there is also a profound dissimilarity here. It is
not gay people under the spell of their pornography that bash other gays, restrict
their civil liberties, censor their expression, divide their families, inhibit their
marriages, and so on. Whatever role straight pornography plays in the complex
causal

network

that

keeps

women

in

their

place,

gay

pornography

obviouslyplays a much different role in keeping gay people in their place, for that
is by and large the work of straight people. Here, the oppressor class, if there is
one, is in the wrong socio-erotic location.
This elementary fact is shockingly under-recognized. The most significant
forms of abuse and subordination that gay men suffer are at the hands of
heterosexual people including, especially, their parents, siblings, pastors,
teachers, doctors, landlords and employers. Still, in one authoritative
compendium of research on the general subject of gender violence,'' we find
thirty-four chapters about heterosexual male violence directed against women,
and one about violence against gay men, and that is about partner abuse in
lesbian and gay relationships.35 Gay bashing-the most overt and familiar form
of violence suffered by lesbians and, especially, gay men-is, in five hundred
pages of close analysis by politically engaged scholars, mentioned exactly once.
This example may fairly stand as a paradigm for the way many writers think
about the oppression of gay men. In the first place, they do not. In the second
place, they imagine it taking place at the hands of other gay men. Of course, if
that were the reality then there might be some reason to wonder whether the new
view of pornography might apply beyond the heterosexual context. What

makes gay men do this to each other?'' they might ask. Someone will surely
answer, Their pornography!'' The reality is quite otherwise. Although partner
abuse is real enough, violence that targets gay people, as well as the more routine
forms of hatred, discrimination and systematic disadvantage, may generally be
imputed to people who are, or purport to be, heterosexual.
Our theories about pornography should therefore show some humility (and
perhaps also shame) in the face of the lack of interest, of research and, thus, of
evidence about the nature and sources of the harms suffered by gay men. Note
that I am not arguing that because there is no available evidence that gay
pornography causes gay men to harm other gay men, it must not. I am making
only two points. First, if we begin with the new paradigm's view of the harm the
pornography causes women, we will find that the analogous harms suffered by
gay men are not in the main caused by gay men. They are caused by heterosexual
women and men whose attitudes are not significantly influenced by gay male
pornography. Thus, while in the gender-dominance theory of pornography the
oppressor class and the class of consumers of pornography strongly overlap, in
the reality of lesbian and gay life, the oppressor class and the class of consumers of
gay pornography are disjoint. Second, while not denying that gay men may
sexually abuse each other and discriminate against each other, there is no
adequate evidence of the role of pornography in causing or constituting this
abuse.
I want to conclude these admittedly sketchy remarks about evidence with one last
point. It is important to bear in mind that if our question is what attitudes to

pornography we should adopt and what policies we should enforce, then we need to
think in terms of a legislative standard of proof, and not an adjudicative standard. In
many political systems

courts have the power to review and strike down

legislation if it offends the local constitution. But there is a crucial difference
between the kind and weight of evidence a court needs to conclude that a
legislature's act may stand, and the kind of evidence a legislature would need to be
justified in legislating. Courts

with

review

powers

should

generally defer to

legislators about the relevant facts, for courts lack the time, resources and expertise
to inquire into them. Thus, there might be enough evidence for a court to be
justified in upholding such legislation once passed, and yet there may not have been
enough evidence to warrant passing it in the first place. (And that is why arguments
about the constitutionality of restricting pornography are a poor guide to the moral
and political question of whether pornography should be restricted.) Ignoring this
distinction has misled many theorists and, especially, many lawyers. MacKinnon,
for example, has said of the Supreme Court of Canada's reasoning in Butler that,
The evidence on the harm of pornography was sufficient for a law against it.''36
This is wrong. Even if the evidence meets the deferential standard to which the
Supreme Court of Canada holds its Parliament, it does not follow that it is
sufficient to justify such a law. (Nor did the Court say that it was.) It shows only
that it was held sufficient for such a law to be constitutional, that is, within the
legal powers of the government. Whether criminalizing pornography is also a wise or
just exercise of those powers is another question entirely. If we bring this distinction
to bear on the possible harmfulness of gay pornography to gay men, I believe that

we will find that the evidence meets neither the legislative nor the adjudicative
standard.37 Compared to what is actually known about the harmfulness of straight
pornography, the fairest way to describe what we know about the effects of gay
pornography would be nothing at all''. Taken together with the fact that

the

relevantly analogous harms are here caused by the wrong audience, the argument
from analogy seems implausibly weak.
V. OBJECTIFICATION AND SUBJECTIFICATION
I want to return now to the matter of sexual objectification. This is claimed to
be one of the main ways that straight pornography harms women, and it
issometimes said that gay pornography promotes a similar sort of objectification
of gay men.38 Allowing that the evidentiary basis is poor, it may nonetheless
be fruitful to explore some more speculative ideas, beginning with the notion
of
objectification'' itself. Martha Nussbaum thinks this is a kind of category
mistake.

One is treating as an object what is really not an object, what is in fact, a

human being''; objectification is thus a matter of

making into a thing, treating as

a thing, something that is really not a thing.''39 This can be done in a variety of
ways, she argues, for example, by treating people as instruments, by denying their
subjectivity, denying their autonomy, or by treating them as lacking agency, or as
violable, ownable, or fungible. Her subtle discussion establishes that there are
complex

relations among these and

that whether objectification is morally

problematic depends on the context.
While we can see what this Kantian distinction between persons and things is

driving at, it is also potentially misleading. For contrary to Nussbaum's
suggestion, the objectification of people is not a matter of treating as an object
what is not an object or a thing, because in many ordinary senses people are
objects and things. Human beings are embodied; we are extended in space; we
exist in time; and we are subject to the laws of nature. Objectification is not

reification. It is a matter of treating as a mere object something that is also more than
an object; it is a matter of denying or devaluing their subjectivity, of failing to
recognize them as ends in themselves.'' To be treated as a sex object is, in
part, for one's own desires, hungers and needs in sex to be removed from view
and to be seen solely as a means to the fulfillment of the desires, hungers and
needs of another.
The point I have in mind parallels one we must make about Kant's categorical
imperative: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your
own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at
the same time as an end.''40 There is here no prohibition on treating people as
means. What is forbidden is to treat them merely as means. This puts a constraint
on the instrumentality of others: they may be treated as means to our ends only if,
in doing so, we also manage to respect their integrity as agents with their own
purposes who, as Kant also puts it in another place, must themselves be able to
share in the ends to which we put them.41 That is why it is so difficult to lead a
good life. We must treat others as instruments, for we need their skills, their
company, and their bodies-in fact, there is little that we social creatures can do
on our own, and so little of that is fulfilling. However, while we need to use

others, in doing so we may not treat them as mere instruments, and that is not
always easy.In ordinary sex we need others as objects in some of the most
ordinary senses of the term: they are intentional objects of our desire, we
want to see, smell, touch and taste their bodies. This is not yet sexual
objectification, however, for that involves subjecting them to our purposes
without regard to their own. There is of course a tradition (of which Kant is one
of the more notorious exponents42) that sees sexual desire as essentially fraught
with

danger.

Despite

some

similarities

with

the

new

paradigm

of

pornography, this cannot be what is at issue here, for on the new view the
gendered dimension is intrinsic to objectification-men's desire is inherently
dangerous-while for Kant women's sexual desire for men is no better. The
new idea is rather that straight pornography produces women as sexual objects
because it represents women as meat, available for consumption and without
regard to whether they can share in the ends to which they are put. Women,
who are both objects and subjects, are said to be represented as mere objects.
This causes two sorts of grave harm. First, it is a kind of subordination, since it
injures their dignity by denying their personhood. That is what we might, to use
Foucault's language, call the productive power of objectification. Second, having
been constructed as objects, it leaves women open and available to abuse of
other kinds: being beaten, raped,

etc. This is the repressive power of

objectification.
Objectification does not, however, actually change the moral status of

a

person, for that is not a matter of social convention.43 To treat people as if they

are mere objects does not make them mere objects. Objectification says that
people are not the very things that they are: the whole possibility of insulting or
degrading someone's personhood begins on the footing that it embodies a kind of
lie about her status. Our subjectivity is an un-won status, something we get for
free, without effort, as is our objectivity. What has to be won is our own

awareness of our subjectivity-we need to see ourselves as the ends that we in
fact are-and others' respect for our subjectivity. However, and here is my main
point, the same is true of our objectivity.
Let me approach this idea through an example. Our instrumentality is one
important part of our objectivity; it is the property of being of potential use to
others who may direct us to their own purposes. This is not sufficient for our
dignity as persons; but some who endorse a disembodied view of personhood
would go further and say that is it not necessary either. Interestingly, nonphilosophers do not agree. Most people desperately want to be of use to
others,and they come to understand themselves partly through their uses,
actual and potential. Of course, they do not want only that, and they want to be
of use and used subject to certain constraints-but the idea of being useful is in
fact valued. Part of what is at stake when people age, when they are severely
disabled, when they are chronically unemployed, is the fear that they are not,
or are no longer, useful. Others do not want them; they fulfil no valued role.
They miss not only their diminished agency, but also their diminished
objectivity. In dire cases people may no longer see themselves as something
desired, wanted, or useful at all, even as they retain their standing as civic

subjects, applicants, supplicants, users or consumers. They become, to coin a
term, subjectified.
Straight women in a patriarchal society rarely have difficulty seeing themselves
as sex objects: that idea is reinforced in myriad ways through parental and peer
pressure, television, popular novels, music, videos, fashion, and also straight
pornography. A better society should support a wider range of self-conceptions,
enable all women more easily to see themselves as subjects, and secure greater
respect for their subjectivity. But what about men, and, in particular, gay men?
Andrea Dworkin thinks that objectification is just the essence of male sexuality
and thus in male homosexuality both partners by definition objectify.''44 But
definitional truths come too cheap. If instead we allow the facts to intervene, how
frequently do gay men find themselves objectified (and objectifying) in a
heterosexist society? Consider this observation by a gay American writer:

[W]ith the history many of us had of being branded eggheads or aesthetes, the
prospect of being apprehended as pure, dumb, meat has an irresistible allure. It's as
close as some of us can imagine to being loved unconditionally''-not for our
clever accomplishments but simply for the mute flesh that we are.45

This passage suggests that being apprehended as pure, dumb, meat''-being in
that way objectified-is for many gay men a substitute (and a poor substitute)
for being the object of unconditional love. That is one explanation for why
someone might want to feel the kind of objectification that results from some
pornography: it may give access to what is socially foreclosed. Of course, this

suggests that that substitution is somewhat pathological, or at the very least,
second-rate. But I think a broader, de-pathologized, version of this idea is worth
exploring.
In a patriarchal society, and in its straight pornography, women are often
apprehended as dumb meat. This is the social context of many pro-censorship
arguments: they purport to be subjectivity promoting. In a heterosexist society,
however, the standard apprehension of the gay man is quite different. First, he is
most often simply invisible or non-existent. Second, when he does occasionally
flit in and out of the frame, it is most often in the figure of one of the dominant
stereotypes: aesthetic, sensitive, different, fabulous, foppish, and so forth.
Whengay boys are taunted for being fairies'' the image is of something airy, silly
and gossamer; it is stereotyped femininity without being a sex-object. (Do fairies
even have sex?) It is not too difficult to see here the risk of a different sort of
harm- the lack of public acknowledgement of, and sometimes even personal
access to, one's sexuality. Another man writes in his autobiography:

Fearful of the intensity of my sexual longings and still wary of being punished if I
admitted that being gay'' was about sex and not about books or politics, I felt
fragmented and even more isolated. Though I had constructed a life that revolved
around my identity as a gay man, I refused to admit the importance that sexual
desire played in this.46

Naturally, I do not claim that being subjectified in these ways represents the
experience of all gay men, still less that it is true by definition. But it is one

common and especially salient experience and, as these passages show, one that is
represented in gay culture and in the self-understanding of gay people. That is
why coming out to oneself'' means not just acknowledging one's own desires but
also the harder work of seeing oneself as a possible object of the kind of desire
that one has. I suggest that just as being objectified is a kind of motif
experience47 for straight women in patriarchal societies, being subjectified is a motif
experience for gay people in heterosexist societies. I do not deny that there are also
aspects of full civic and human agency that are denied gay people: innocent
sex acts are widely criminalized, legal marriage is generally impossible, and so on.
And it would be an exaggeration to think that the subjectivity of gay men is in
every respect as precarious as that of heterosexual women. However, when
lesbian and gay sexualities are regarded as unnatural, disgusting, perverted,
immoral, sick, or just plain weird, one thing gay subjects may lose or fail to
develop is a robust sense of their own objectivity. Without that, a gay sexuality still
can be spiritual, political or intellectual. What it cannot be is hot, wet or fun. One
can see oneself as different, special, or sensitive, or, in the jargon of postmodern

queer theorists,'' as having an ironic, parodic or performative attitude to

gender.48 But one cannot easily see oneself as sexy. There is a real loss here. As
Wallace Stevens put it in his poem,

Esthe'tique du mal'':

The greatest poverty is not to live
In a physical world, to feel that one's desire
Is too difficult to tell from despair.49

We need therefore to be cautious in addressing and evaluating complaints
about urban gay culture in wealthy countries: that it is looks-ist,'' that it
overvalues youth, that it promotes the fungibility of sexual partners and the
impermanence of relationships. Some of these do echo familiar complaints about
sexist society. But there are also important differences. First, in the gay context
these complaints embrace stereotypes whose foundations in reality need to be
tested-particularly the association of gay men with promiscuity. Second, this
culture is in any case but one, possibly small, fragment of life among
homosexually inclined men in our societies. Third and most important, while
heterosexual pornography may be said to reflect, repeat and endorse the general
sexist view of women, homosexual pornography does not reflect, repeat or
endorse the general heterosexist view of gay men.
In that social context, and facing those challenges, how should we regard texts
or images that do objectify gay men? Ambivalently, I hope. As sexual beings gay
men need to be treated as ends in themselves, and most pornography does little to
help that; but if they are to be sexual they also need to be treated as, and to be
able to see themselves as, the possible object of another's desire. That is one of
pornography's contributions, some of the time. When gay pornography does
objectify we still need to remember that that is but one vector in a complex space
of social interactions. In a homophobic society most of those are, for gay men,
both sex- and body-negative. In its dissenting voice, gay pornography celebrates
the male body as sexually desirable to other men; it displays men enacting this
desire; it focuses our attention on that one fact about them; it exaggerates and

overvalues it. Even if that is sometimes bad in itself, it does not follow that it is
bad overall. That depends on what is going on in the rest of society, and not just
on what is going on in an urban gay subculture. What if the dominant culture
systematically denies and represses the desirability of men to other men? What if
it targets for discrimination and abuse those who feel, acknowledge or act on that
desire? What if it simply behaves as if sexual desire is by nature heterosexual? In
that context-which is to say, in our context-how should the lusty voice of
objectification be heard? What net effects on the lives of its consumers might it be
expected to have? Gay pornography contributes to gay life what is everywhere
else denied-that gay sexualities exist, that gay men are sexual beings, and that
men may be objects of male desire. How highly we value all that surely depends
on the baseline from which we start. For some objectivity comes easily,
subjectivity must be won. For others, including many gay men, subjectivity is
fairly secure; it is objectivity that feels precarious and fragile.
VI. CONTEXTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Let me summarize, then moralize. There is little reason to think that gay
pornography causes the same harms as straight pornography, or even analogous
harms. Moreover, some common features of pornography, for instance,
promoting sexual objectification, may be expected to have significantly
different consequences for gay men than they do for straight women. So,
whatever the (here unassayed50) strengths of the new paradigm in understanding
heterosexual pornography, it will need substantial modification before it can
begin to illuminate the moral problematic of gay pornography.

Could we just leave it there, confining the new paradigm to its natural habitat,
and theorize non-heterosexual pornography separately?51 That might be an
advance. But perhaps the problem of sexual orientation suggests other sorts of
trouble for the paradigm. Object choice-the kind of person or thing one finds
arousing-is but one sort of sexual variation, and sex of object choice, what we
usually call sexual orientation,'' is only one further subdimension. Our
sexualities vary in many other ways. For instance, there are other, non-sexual,
variations in object (some people prefer younger or older partners, homo- or
hetero-racial partners, smarter and duller partners, and so on) and there is also
what Freud called variations of sexual aim'' (some people would rather look
than touch, some are genitally-focussed others are not, etc.). The powerful, and
artificial, binarisms of gay'' and straight'' currently dominate our public sexual
culture, but they do not displace a lush ontology of private sexualities.
That being so, we might begin to wonder about other pornographies too. If
gay male pornography is significantly different, then surely so is lesbian
pornography-it is not difficult to see how some of the arguments offered here
might be extended to that case. But then what about sado-masochistic
pornography, or even heterosexual pornography catering to that exceptional
and minuscule'' proportion of non-violent male desire? Are we to say that these
are not pornography'' in the meaning of the act, that the new paradigm is
correct and illuminating about the central case and inadequate only in marginal,
deviant cases? Are we perhaps to say that these are not even pornography'' at
all, but erotica,'' or something else?

We might of course do all of this, were there any reason to. But that merely
shows that the new paradigm may be made consistent, not that it is correct. Here
as elsewhere political philosophy cannot ride on the back of definition. While
some suppose that there is an interesting distinction to be drawn between
pornography and erotica, it is in fact idle. There is, of course, a usable distinction
in ordinary language: erotica is less explicit and less visual than is
pornography.But that is not what the objector has in mind, and her
stipulative distinction misinterprets the interplay between our normative
judgments and our classificatory systems in this area. People do not
classify artifacts into
pornography'' or erotica'' and on that basis form moral and political
judgments about them. On the contrary, the judgments are engaged from the
beginning, and erotica'' is often little more than a label whatever sort of
pornography is judged tolerable. There is no point in stipulating a narrow
definition of pornography'' and then pretending, if it turns out that gay
pornography slips through that net, there is no such thing as gay pornography

strictly speaking. At this point, wisdom has taken a holiday. Gay male
pornography is pornography if anything is, and if it does not harm women
then that gives us all the reason we need to reject a gendered definition of
pornography.
There is a broader conceptual point at stake here, and I want to conclude with
a couple of remarks about it. Pornography is not an aesthetic kind, but a loosely
related family of artifacts bound by analogy and function: it is mostly

masturbation material.''52 But when you think of it that way, it is easy to see
why there are unlikely to be many true and morally significant generalizations
about the harmfulness of such material. It all depends on who is aroused by what,
and on what their respective social positions are. The only way there could be
moral laws governing the kind, pornography,'' would be if our sexualities were
more or less the same and if they were treated in more or less the same way by
society. That they are not and that this makes all the difference has been the
central argument of this paper.
Is the concern about context purely theoretical? Sadly, it is not. MacKinnon
and Dworkin call the Butler decision a breakthrough in equality jurisprudence''
for they suppose that it replaces moralism with attention to harm, and that it
heralds a new sensitivity to equality. But after Butler the record of the state in
attending to pornography has been just what one would have predicted53: among
the first prosecutions was a lesbian magazine with a paid Canadian circulation of
a few dozen. Then, Canadian customs officers continued their pattern of ignorant
and homophobic seizures targeting women's and lesbian and gay bookstores.
(One of the most amusing was the 1994 customs detention of The Sexual Politics of

Meat, a tome of feminist-vegetarian critical theory en route to a bookstore
specializing in women's spirituality and ecology.)
Wholly undeterred by these wholly predictable events, MacKinnon and
Dworkin still defend their view. Now empiricists, they find the connection
between upholding the obscenity laws and impounding lesbian, gay and feminist
books deemed obscene to be based on

sheer innuendo; no cause-and-effect

linkhas been shown. Canadian customs employees have been doing what they
have been authorized to do for years before Butler.''54 But this ignores a point
crucial to their analysis of heterosexual pornography. The fact that the
oppression of women is overdetermined does not prove that pornography lacks any
effect. It is practically certain that mainstream religions, popular music,
professional sports and typical family life are all much more invasive and
authoritative agents of sexist oppression than are pornographic books or videosbut that does not show that pornography is not also on the list. Likewise, the
fact that there are other sufficient causes is quite consistent with the fact that
customs officers feel reassured and even emboldened by the declared
constitutionality of the obscenity laws. Upholding the constitutionality of
criminal prohibitions on obscenity does not only effect criminal prosecutions
about obscenity. Here, where the idea of
legitimation'' has literal import, these theorists seem to miss it.
I began by criticizing some Canadian judges, so let me end by giving another
Canadian judge the last word:

[E]rotica produced for heterosexual audiences performs largely an entertainment
function, but homosexual erotica is far more important to homosexuals . . . [S]exual
text and imagery produced for homosexuals serves as an affirmation of their
sexuality and as a socializing force . . . it normalizes the sexual practices that the
larger society has historically considered to be deviant . . . it organizes homosexuals
as a group and enhances their political power. Because sexual practices are so
integral to homosexual culture, any law proscribing representations of sexual

practices will necessarily affect homosexuals to a greater extent than it will other
groups in society .............55

I hope that my arguments suggest why this is correct. And at least some forms of
contemporary feminism have the conceptual resources to recognize it, for the
new paradigm of pornography is not the only advance in the field. Equally
important are the claims that the concrete is as important as the abstract, the
contextual as the universal. Would it be all right to begin to take these ideas
seriously-not just theories of knowledge or the metaphysics of morality, but
even in practice and even in our thinking about pornography?56 If we do, how
long will we remain content with the idea that pornography is about men
possessing

women,

that

all

male

sexuality

is

about

power,

that

sexualobjectification is always harmful, that pornographers set the rules in the
one and only game of sex? And if those claims need qualification, how far will
we need to rethink our prescriptions in the area of public policy? Will broadranging criminal prohibitions or wide rights of civil action prove justifiable? If,
in sum, we regulate pornographies as if they were all just pornography, how will
the values of autonomy or equality really be affected? To ask the question
is to answer it.
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